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For a long time there seemed to be a broad consensus in Western democracies ― at least 
among political theorists and legal scholars ― concerning the place of religion in the 
public sphere and the separation of church and state. However, since the end of the last 
century, religion has again become a highly contentious issue. With the arrival of sizable 
groups of immigrants for whom religion remains an integral part of their identity ― not 
only Muslims, but also evangelical Christians ― religion is back in the public square 
of many modern Western democracies (a place, arguably, it never really disappeared 
from in the United States). This reassertion of religion, Stanley Fish observed in 2005, 
has ‘re-alerted us to the fact […] that hundreds of millions of people in the world do 
not observe the distinction between the private and the public, or between belief and 
knowledge, and that it is no longer possible for us to regard such persons as quaintly 
pre-modern or as needy recipients of our saving (an ironic word) wisdom’. In the same 
article, Fish predicted that religion was going to be the wave of the future in academics: 
‘Announce a lecture or panel on ‘religion in our time’ and you will have to hire a larger 
hall’.1 
 Intrigued by this resurgence of religion ― and tempted by a high attendance rate ― 
we hired a larger hall and convened a conference on ‘Religion in the 21st Century’ at 
the Erasmus School of Law, in September 2011. The focus of this conference was the 
question: Does the revival of religion confront us with a familiar phenomenon that we 
can describe and analyse in tried-and-tested categories, or has religious experience 
transformed into something altogether different, which demands a new approach, a new 
way of relating to religion? The articles collected in this special issue all originate from 
this gathering and all, in their own way, try to come to terms with its central theme. 
 The secularisation thesis, in its classic Weberian form, remains a mainstay of sociology 
and social theory. Modernisation, rationalisation and functional differentiation are still 
widely believed to lead to a retreat of religion from more and more spheres of social 
life, to a growing disenchantment of the world and, eventually, to the disappearance of 
religion. However, so far, this expectation has failed to materialise. With the exception 
of a number of countries in Western Europe, religion remains a potent force in modern 
societies around the globe. This endurance, or even resurgence, of religion, as Eduardo 
Mendieta and Jonathan VanAntwerpen argue in a recent volume on religion in the 
public sphere, has called into question a number of our central notions and myths about 
religion: ‘Religion is neither merely private, for instance, nor purely irrational. And the 
public sphere is neither a realm of straightforward rational deliberation nor a smooth 
space of unforced assent. Yet, these understandings of both religion and public life have 
long been pervasive, perhaps especially in academic circles’.2 
 Moreover, the persistence of religion has raised questions about the notion of 
secularism as something that needs no argument, as a mere absence of religion with 
no substantive content of its own. Secularism is a position in its own right, which has 
developed into different forms, and is not simply a neutral response to problems of 
religion.3 Consequently, the secular nature of liberal democracy is losing its artless, self-
evident quality. Secularism is coming under increased scrutiny. Indeed, in a number of 
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recent works, even the devoutly secular theorist Jürgen Habermas has retreated from his 
previous secularism, and has started talking about the rise of the ‘post-secular’ society, 
that needs to adjust to the enduring presence of religion, even under conditions of 
continuing modernisation. Not only that, but Habermas argues that liberal democracies 
should not shirk from using their rich religious traditions to manage the intractable 
issues facing the modern world, issues that purely secular thought lacks the resources 
to deal with.4
 This re-emergence of religion and concurrent challenge to secular orthodoxy has, in 
turn, revamped interest in, and support for, secularism. It is as if the new assertiveness of, 
and interest in, religion has elicited a critical response in academic and public debates. 
This interest in secularism is particularly evident in the renewed appreciation for the 
Enlightenment ― which has become a topic discussed in newspaper columns, internet 
blogs and television debates, ― and above all, in the growing prestige of the so-called 
Radical Enlightenment. Philosophers of the early Radical Enlightenment, like Baruch 
Spinoza and Pierre Bayle, have gained stature as representatives of the truly radical 
democratic and secular moment in the Enlightenment. Conversely, later Enlightenment 
thinkers like John Locke and David Hume have been diminished. They are now often 
viewed as people who sold out and who diluted the towering achievements of the early 
Enlightenment to accommodate the political establishment and religious tradition. With 
respect to the separation of church and state, this revisionist view of the Enlightenment 
seems to suggest that the problem today is not that liberal-democratic states are not 
sufficiently responsive to the demands of religious groups, but that liberal-democratic 
states are far too accommodating to these demands. Instead of accommodating 
traditional Muslims and Christians, we should embrace reason and autonomy, and stand 
up to religious superstition and unreasoned tradition.
 If these introductory remarks provide an impression of the scene in broad brush 
strokes, then the first contribution by Veit Bader, ‘“Post-Secularism” or Liberal-
Democratic Constitutionalism?’, provides an immediate and welcome correction to this 
general overview. Bader subjects broad concepts and categories like secular, religion 
and post-secular to critical scrutiny, and censures the lack of sensitivity to the historical 
contingency and complexity of the phenomena these concepts refer to. There is a whiff 
of what the American Legal Realists used to call anti-conceptualism in Bader’s analysis. 
‘The old categories are imposing in their purple, but they are all too big to handle’, 
Bader seems to sigh, like the Legal Realist Karl Llewellyn before him: ‘They hold too 
many heterogeneous items to be reliable in use’.5 Bader suggests that we should drop 
these concepts and all the baggage they come with from our constitutional and legal 
language and replace secularism with the term ‘liberal-democratic constitutionalism’.
 Critique of legal and political discourse also characterises the second article by 
Markha Valenta, ‘Pluralist Democracy or Scientistic Monocracy? Debating Ritual 
Slaughter’. The article deals with the recent public debates that surrounded the Dutch 
bill to abolish ritual slaughter. Valenta provides a critical reconstruction of the debate 
and raises questions about the secular, techno-scientific discourse that was employed to 
limit the rights of religious minorities. 
 The third article by Ann-Sophie Vandenberghe, ‘Regulating the Relationship 
Between State and Religion: An Economic Approach’, investigates state neutrality 
towards religious groups in Dutch society from an economic perspective. In a way, 
Vandenberghe sidesteps the thorny issues of religious neutrality and secularism, and 
looks at forms of Dutch state aid in terms of economic neutrality. Her conclusion is 
that, to a large extent, state support for religious activities already tracks patterns of 
economic neutrality, even though there are a number of exceptions. 
 The focus is broadened by the international scope of the fourth article of this special 
issue, ‘Duties of reasonable accommodation in relation to religion and the European 
Court of Human Rights’, by Kristin Henrard. Henrard argues that duties of reasonable 
accommodation should be identified by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
with respect to religion, in order to realise equal opportunities and substantive equality, 
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and to level the playing field and even out barriers to full participation. Henrard argues 
that such duties of reasonable accommodation follow logically from the ECtHR’s case 
law.
 The final article extends the discussion about the constitutional freedom of religion 
and conscience to the political and legal thought of the early modern period. In ‘Locke 
and Bayle on Religious Toleration’, Marlies Galenkamp addresses the current vogue of 
the Radical Enlightenment. She qualifies and tempers the notion that the truly modern 
Radical Enlightenment was betrayed by the representatives of the later Enlightenment. 
Through a meticulous reconstruction of Pierre Bayle’s and John Locke’s ideas about 
religious freedom and the toleration of religious diversity, Galenkamp arrives at the 
conclusion that both still have a great deal to contribute to a contemporary conception 
of the freedom of religion, a conception that should be less absolute than current 
constitutional doctrine assumes. 
